Introduction

The study of bureaucracy has been a central concern of social scientists since Weber first sought to define types of legitimate authority and their organizational concomitants. His work has given birth to an entire industry concerned with examining the patterns of social relations within organizations, especially so-called formal bureaucratic ones, and with the articulation of organizations with each other and their environments. Interestingly enough, however, relatively little interest has been taken in analyzing the sources of bureaucratization; or, to put it more broadly, why complex organizations in the modern period have taken on the form Weber described (Markoff 1975:479–80; Meyer and Brown 1977:365; Meyer 1979; Williamson 1981). This neglect has been especially notable in the study of state bureaucracies (Sheriff 1976b:38–40).

The primary emphasis in this area has been on how either central or local bureaucracies and bureaucrats work, with special concern for decision making and makers (Allison 1971; Downs 1967; Lowi 1969, 1978; Heady 1979; Borcharding 1977; Blanc 1971; Crozier 1964; Debasch 1969; Isomura and Kuronuma 1974; Ide et al. 1974). The question of why bureaucracies take on a particular form has been addressed only in the most general terms or is implicit in historical descriptions (DiMaggio and Powell 1983).

The lack of interest in the question of why state bureaucracies take on particular forms is rather puzzling. The problem is, at least theoretically, if not instrumentally, important for political scientists, sociologists, and economists. In terms of theory, the problem is related to general questions of state formation and organizational change within the state and its political structure. The literature on modern state formation and development appears to view the process of bureaucratization along the lines described by Weber as a central feature of the evolution of the rational state (Tilly 1975:29; Bendix 1964:136–37; Skocpol 1979:47–48, 286; Skocpol 1985:14–18; Poggi 1978:86–116; Huntington 1968:157–58; MIT Study Group 1967:32–33; Ward 1968:7–8; Oganski 1965 [1967]; Almond and Powell 1966:36–46; Marx and Engels 1971; Anderson 1979:19–20). Agreement exists that bureaucratization is one of the identifying characteristics of the emergence and development of the modern state. Nevertheless, there have been few attempts to construct an appropriate explanation, on the basis of comparative analysis, of the process by which the rationalization of state bureaucracies was originally institutionalized.

The literature on state development appears to take for granted that ra-
tionalization of state authority must take on the particular structural characteristics Weber so acutely observed in Western European societies. Hierarchy, hierarchical authority, career, specialization, differentiation, expertise, and contractual possession of office have been viewed as necessary because they seem to constitute the only functionally efficient way of reducing the social and private costs of uncoordinated activities. From this point of view, as societies became more complex the problem of coordination worsened. Bureaucratic or rationalized administration came to be viewed as the response to the high costs of uncoordinated activities. While there is a logical ring to this deduction, there is not much more substance to it than that provided by Weber. We are left with the questions of whether this was in fact the case and if so, of how bureaucratic organization uniquely meets the demands of uncoordinated activity.

The question, then, of the relationship of the state to the bureaucratic administrative structure is also raised. Clearly no one assumes that the former is the equivalent of the latter—state and administration are not usually seen as synonymous. There is good reason not to make this assumption. Since the end of the eighteenth century, states have acquired seemingly similar rational bureaucratic administrative structures even though they took on different political forms. The resultant paradox has been well and often noted by a broad range of nineteenth- and twentieth-century observers, of whom Tocqueville, Weber, and Durkheim are the best known. On the one hand, the seemingly convergent process of bureaucratization seems to imply that the state is in some way autonomous; else why the ubiquitous nature of rational administration? On the other hand, the differences in political structure seem to suggest that the state is informed and subsumed by society; else how to explain the variety of political forms?

What is striking about the observation of this seeming paradox is the lack of attention paid to the idea of the state as an autonomous organization until quite recently. A considerable body of theory and opinion stresses the illusory nature of the state's autonomy and, therefore, of the paradox as well (Dahl 1956; Huntington 1968; Parsons and Shils 1951:162; Binder, Coleman et al. 1971; Almond, Flanagan, and Munti 1973; Marx and Engels 1971; Poulantzas 1978; Anderson 1979; Miliband 1969; Therborn 1978). Such arguments are largely functional on ones that have not produced much in the way of an empirical base. The argument is that modern society, however defined, requires the rational-legal bureaucratic state and therefore it is assumed to be a reflection of or epiphenomenal to social dynamics. Recently, a number of writers have argued that states, as collective actors in both domestic and international arenas, are autonomous (Skocpol 1979 and 1985; Trimberger 1978; Krasner 1984; Evans, Rueschmeyer, and Skocpol 1985).

These ideas suggest that the organizational characteristics of the state have emergent properties which make it possible for policies to appear which are not the expected consequences of any single interest or class pressure. Rather, policies in this view are seen sometimes, if not always, as functional responses to long-term problems. In this respect, the solutions are beneficial in the long run but not necessarily in the short run. This is the characteristic sometimes described as “rational.”

Which view is substantially correct is not clear. But it seems both rather odd and extremely difficult to pursue either argument for very long without examining theoretically and substantively the question of why state organization takes on the form it does despite wide variations in class structure, economic development, and political form from state to state. The question is critical primarily because the question of state autonomy centers precisely on the problem of the institutionalization of bureaucratic organization. How and under what circumstances state bureaucracies take on the characteristics that render them “rational” and thus putatively autonomous—that is, possessing the capacity to make policies and decisions free from constraints which we might normally expect to operate—is thus of central importance in assessing the whole problem of the relation of state to society. Substantively, the problem is important because it bears directly on the formation and implementation of public policy. Clearly, it makes a difference for evaluating public policy outcomes if we have different explanations as to why administrative organization and roles take on a particular form. Suspending disbelief for the moment and assuming, for example, that bureaucratic organization is indeed the “efficient” and “rational” response to political or economic problems provides a structural approach to overcoming the oft-noted gap between stated policy goals and their implementation. This view is likely to lead to attempts to specify the nature of the failure and thereby create the appropriate public or private structure for dealing with the problem. In short, this view tends to assume that the rational norms of efficient organizations will provide efficient responses to implementation problems. Suspending disbelief in another direction, however, and assuming that organizational characteristics are not functional responses to political or economic market failures but responses to individual fears over uncertain futures produces quite different prescriptions. If bureaucrats are committed to organizational roles out of concern for individual and institutional futures, then we can conclude that some policies will never be implemented. Attempts will then be made to reduce the discretion of bureaucrats and to hold them strictly accountable. One view might thus lead to increasing state autonomy while the other to decreasing state autonomy. At the same time, one leads to the increasing bureaucratization of policy-making while the other leads to increasing decentralization.
Introduction

The Problem: The Nature of Rationalization

By 1920, the institutionalization of rational-legal bureaucracy had become the predominant mode of organizing the authoritative distribution of resources in many states. Weber's observation about the ubiquity of bureaucratic administration was not only a prophecy about the course of state development but also an assertion about secular trends. The nineteenth century had seen every major state transform the means by which public goods and benefits were distributed. In the process, the structures of power were profoundly reshaped. Several things appear to be characteristic of these transformations. First, Weber noted, there was a convergence toward uniformity of organizational characteristics. What he termed "rational-legal" organizational structure seemed everywhere to be organized around the transformation of the administrative role, which, in turn, produced structural change. The transformation of two aspects of this role was crucial—the relationship of the individual to the office and the criteria for acquiring, holding, and advancing in office.

The relationship of the individual to the office focused on the question of whether office-holding was a matter of public or private law. Certainly, by the end of the century all the major states had removed office-holding from the domain of private property and private law. Individuals no longer had property rights to offices. The public character of the role was established by removing the officeholder from ownership of the "means of administration" and by creating uniform rules that qualitatively and quantitatively defined the function and discretion of office. The officeholder now became accountable to a set of formal organizational rules that could be observed and regulated rather than to the informal and unregulated rules governing patron-client relations.

This shift in the definition of role immediately created, wherever it occurred, the problem of selection. If the holding of administrative office was not the gift of an individual who conveyed it on the basis of rules which assumed that private and public interest were synonymous, then what mechanism of selection could be put in its place? Furthermore, how would one be assured that such a mechanism would not produce an equally private pursuit of interest? The solution that emerged entailed the utilization of a system of knowledge, the possession of which could be measured. The acquisition of knowledge was established as the basis for appointment to office. Notably, the required knowledge was not necessarily technical or expert in character. Instead, it was the length and nature of the educational career that came to be valued, and tests were devised to measure the degree to which individuals possessed this experience. A corollary of this rule developed: the more exclusive and the higher the cost of the knowledge acquired, the greater the capacity to hold office.

The problems of continuity and succession posed by removing offices from the private sphere were resolved by relating offices to levels of knowledge in an hierarchical manner. This made it possible to move individuals through a series of offices on the basis of some easily observable and measurable criterion. Seniority became the measure for determining knowledge acquired by experience. By extension, seniority then became a standard minimal means for determining a systematic movement through offices. This resolution transformed office-holding into a career.

This metamorphosis of the administrative role produced an organizational structure that was relatively autonomous by virtue of possessing an internal labor market. The administrative structure now possessed a distinct set of rules for allocating both labor and resources. These rules were internal to the organization and thus considerably, if not completely, removed from market forces. Moreover, these rules distanced the official from direct external sources of influence and control. Crucial to the autonomy of this market was that access to it was limited not by private interest but by "objectively" determined merit. The use of objective criteria—examinations and seniority—was seen to reflect the public character of the role. In sum, the rationalization of the administrative role focused on the separation of office-holding from the "ownership" of the means of administration; explicit public rules defining eligibility, recruitment, and advancement in office; and the predictability of career and career status.

The seeming autonomy of the rationalized administrative structures that emerged provides further perplexities. From the end of the eighteenth century on there seems to have been a correlation between the rationalization and autonomy of state administration and the erosion and dissolution of stratified castelike relations of individuals to the state. Equality before the law became singularly characteristic of nineteenth-century regimes, regardless of how this was translated into political power and rights. This seems contradictory. We might expect ideas of equality to produce state administrations that were more, rather than less, accountable to society. That it is a practical and not just a theoretical contradiction is reflected in the problem of integrating the executive and legislative structures to the structure of administration which has been a major focus of political energies since the end of the eighteenth century. At the heart of this problem was the self-conscious transformation of the administrative role from the easily accountable but private, informal patron-client base to the protected but public, contractual administrative role that was, paradoxically, much less accountable in a direct fashion.
This transformation of the administrative role was institutionalized in such a manner in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that it has not only endured great political and economic upheavals but has become the basic building block of organizational life. The process of institutionalization enlisted the values of "publicness," or accountability and merit. These values were vested primarily in the institutions of education, law, and lawmaking. As a result, the institutionalization of the "rational" administrative role came to rest on a complex structure of relationships between schools, universities, legal systems, and lawmakers. This body of relationships sustained and continue to sustain the status and legitimacy of the rational bureaucratic role in so interdependent a fashion that failure to continue this support would call into question the legitimacy and social value of these institutions.

Variations in Organizational Rationality

Most perplexing about the transformation of the administrative role, perhaps, is that there appear to be quite different organizational outcomes in this process. Despite the similarities in the definition of the rationalized administrative role as it emerged in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, all bureaucratic roles and organizational structures did not end up alike. Students of comparative public administration have long noted this anomaly (Heady 1979; Chapman 1959; Ridley 1979; Armstrong 1973; Barker 1944; Peters 1978; Crozier 1964; Crozier 1970; Morstein Marx 1957). They have, however, provided very little in the way of convincing arguments as to why a seemingly universal process results in such different forms. In large part, this weakness is the consequence of a failure to provide an adequate set of analytical categories (Heady 1979).

At the heart of this failure to provide an adequate taxonomy of administrative bureaucratic organization is the reliance over the past several decades on Weber’s ideal types as the basis for analysis. This arises, I believe, from a basic flaw in the Weberian approach. This flaw arises from the temptation to transform Weber’s ideal types of authority—charismatic, traditional, and the legal-rational (Weber 1978, 1:215)—into a continuum with charismatic as a transitional category. This has been produced by taking Weber’s laundry-list of characteristics that supposedly typify legal-rational structures and converting them into scalar indices. In this process, the traditional type becomes one anchor of the scale. The logical conclusion of this transformation of categories is that the other end of the scale becomes the most rational and, at the same time, the least traditional.

The resultant categorization of real-world administrative structures turns out to be somewhat odd, to say the least. At one end of the scale are the state administrations most closely approximating the Weberian ideal type; these include France, Germany, Japan, and, to a lesser extent, Italy and Spain (Heady 1979; Morstein Marx 1957). At the other end of the scale are those that closely approach traditional authority and its associated patrimonial organizational structure; these have been identified by various names and acronyms, such as LDC’s (less-developed countries) and developing societies (Heady 1979; Riggs 1964). On this scaling system, the United States and Great Britain, for example, seem to fall somewhere in the middle. The inference that one must draw from this evaluation and categorization produces no small difficulties. This placement does violence to our intuitive feeling that these two countries are as well developed as those at the most legal-rational/least-traditional end.

How can we satisfactorily explain the placement of these two countries as somewhere between less-developed countries and Germany, France, or Japan? The obvious correlation and explanation—the extent of the division of labor and its correlation with legal-rational characteristics—doesn’t really work very well. First, if there is a strong correlation between the division of labor and organizational rationality, then we could expect the United States and Great Britain to be well up on the scale along with the others. Second, if this is generally the right correlation, then how do we explain that historically, France, Japan, and Germany experienced the institutionalization of rationalized administration at the very early stages of industrialization in their societies? Furthermore, given the developmental experience of France, Japan, and Germany, how do we explain the now irritating fact that whatever rationalization occurred in the United States and Great Britain (and for that matter in Canada, Australia, and Switzerland) did so at quite late stages of industrialization? Any division-of-labor/rationalized-bureaucracy argument cannot explain both sets of developmental experience.

Somewhat similar things might be said regarding an argument stressing the role of increasing general economic complexity and differentiation. It is difficult, however, to think of a division-of-labor argument that would satisfactorily explain the development of the variations in state bureaucratic organization. One might argue, as Weber has done, that capitalism produces

1. These characteristics are usually described as follows: hierarchy, hierarchical responsibility, discipline, achievement orientation, the utilization of rules to qualitatively and quantitatively define office, specialization, differentiation, contractual participation, secular fixed compensation and career (see Weber 1978).

2. The patrimonial structure is generally characterized in the following fashion: patronage, status hierarchy, ascriptive orientation, diffusion, custom as the basis of defining office, ownership of the means of administration, randomness in the terms of office (Weber 1978:4, 228-41 and 217-23).
the urge toward convergence in this area of behavior. But, whatever state organizational rationalization took place in the United States and Great Britain did so in a way that seems epiphenomenal to an advanced industrial capitalism. The opposite seems to be the case in France, Japan, and Germany—rationalized capitalism appears to be in many ways epiphenomenal to rationalized state bureaucracy. This suggests that, unless one is prepared to make a rigorous and rigorous argument about the existence of systematically different forms of capitalism and how these have different organizational outcomes, we cannot rely on macrofunctionalist explanations of the variations in bureaucratic organizational development. The problem cannot be solved by lumping the United States', the English, and similar administrative structures with those of Western continental Europe and Japan on a set of scalar indices. Nevertheless, it seems clear that we are right to think of these as dissimilar in structure.

The strong-state/weak-state distinction suggested by Nettl and others (Nettl 1968; Barker 1944) as basic categories that explain the variation in the structure of state bureaucracies does not, upon close examination, help us very much. It is, first of all, a tautology if a “strong state” is one possessing a state administration closely resembling the Weberian legal-rational ideal type. If, however, the strong state is defined as the capacity of a central government to determine policy over the possible or putative resistance of the periphery, then a different objection arises. The argument then is that, historically, we should expect strong states to produce highly rationalized state administrative structures. In this situation, the historical correlation between a strong state and the extent of bureaucratic rationalization and/or centralization does not turn out to be all that great. Witness the strong state in England and the weak state in Japan in the early modern period. On the Weberian legal-rational organizational scale of characteristics, Japan ended with a more rationalized bureaucratic structure than did England at the beginning of the twentieth century, even though they started from quite different levels of “strength.”

One result of facing these anomalies has been that some analysts have sought to assign differences in administrative organizational structure to differences in culture, especially political culture (Heady 1979; Morstein Marx 1957; Crozier 1964; Berger 1957; Tsuji 1952; Nakane 1970; Krislov 1974). This approach leads to a difficult position in which neither the extent of the division of labor nor political culture appear to be necessary conditions for the emergence and shaping of rational bureaucratic organization. In the latter case, even if we suspend disbelief about the ability to define political culture and the warrants for its underlying assumptions of isomorphism, we are still faced with the problem of how to explain that such widely differing societies as Japan, France, and Germany end up possessing similar state admin-

istrative structures. The problem becomes even more difficult when we note that Spain, Italy, Norway, and Denmark, for example, have state administrative organizations and structures that resemble those of France, Japan, and Germany far more than they do those of the United States and Great Britain. The idea that these societies share or shared a sufficient number of cultural constructs so that the process of political development could be shaped by isomorphic transference from social structure in such a way so as to produce similar outcomes places considerable strain on our credulity.

One might argue that political culture is in good part the inheritance of history. Institutions get created and, for a variety of reasons, get to be sufficiently valued that they persist even though social values and behavior change. Thus, some behaviors seem at odds with others, but both are sufficiently valued that interested groups make strenuous efforts to explain away or legitimize such anomalies. In this way, it might well be argued that in Japan, to take one case, there was a proto-legal-rational bureaucratic organization in existence prior to the modern period. This proto-bureaucratic organization and its values came to be valued so that even in the absence of a complex division of labor it persisted and enabled the emergence of a fully rationalized structure prior to an advanced division of labor (Najita 1974:16–42).

The major problem with such proto-bureaucratic explanations is that the notion of bureaucratic legacy is derived primarily from chronological sequence rather than from an argument that spells out the dynamics of how proto-moves to mature rationalization. Such arguments commit the scalar fallacy. As we move toward the low end of the continuum of rationalization, there are points at which it is possible to say that they are proto-rational. Reading backward along the Weberian scalar indices is, however, not an explanation but an argument about the present being the function of the past. Such a view leads to infinite regression with no explanation in sight as to what fuels the drive toward rationalization.

The problem of categorization can be resolved to a large extent if we view the Weberian characteristics not as a series of scalar indices of structure but rather as a description or definition of role characteristics. The question then is no longer whether an administrative structure is more or less rational.
but whether an essential constellation of role characteristics is present. This allows us to ask whether or not there are different ways of arriving at this constellation of role characteristics described as “rational” (Stinchcombe 1959; Meyer 1968; Child 1973a). This focuses attention on the following aspects: the quantified and qualified definitions of eligibility, recruitment, appointment, promotion, career, and discretion, primarily of upper-level civil servants. Indeed, the literature on organizations, especially state administrative organizations, suggests there are two basic ways the bureaucratic role may be organized. Despite the particular historical forms that state bureaucratization has taken, at least two varieties of role systems govern the form and structure of the rationalized administrative organization.

Organizational Orientation

This pattern is characterized by the presence of rules governing the criteria for higher offices that stress entry into the organizational career prior to appointment to office. In this pattern, early commitment to the bureaucratic role is critical. The high value placed on early commitment by the individual is reflected in the establishment of severe restrictions on eligibility and recruitment. These take the form of limiting eligibility to those who have passed through highly specific courses of university training (such as, and usually, law); and/or attended specific schools designed to train upper-level civil servants; and/or served in some form of apprenticeship program before being appointed to office. Whatever the particular form of the requirement, the general result is that individuals are asked to forego other alternatives and give themselves over to the idea of a bureaucratic career relatively early in their educational careers. As Armstrong has acutely noted:

Future European elite administrators (even, as we shall see, in the U.S.S.R.) almost invariably become aware of their career prospects at least a few years in advance. In fact, ... the higher educational experience of most young men who eventually enter the administrative elite is structured to create awareness. The Oxbridge experience is least structured, for at graduation a young man is just as well equipped to continue toward any other elite profession as to enter the Administrative Class. (Armstrong 1973:201)

Such early commitment requires incentives, since other career possibilities become closed off. These incentives take the form of career predictability—or reducing uncertainty about one’s future. There are two aspects to this predictability: one is a more general concern, and the other relates to specific personal status. The former takes the shape of limiting entry into higher office only to those who have made the prescribed early commitment.

Appointment to this level of office by other means, such as promotion from lower ranks or lateral entry from another organization, is rare. Early commitment assures the individual of eligibility for a high-status office. The aspect related to personal status takes the form of highly predictable patterns of promotion, usually based on seniority. This provides a minimal assurance of career advancement. In combination, these two status incentives ensure eligibility for high office and, if one is appointed, promotion to a minimally high level of office within the upper levels of the civil service.

Incentive systems of this kind have produced, or are at least highly correlated with, significant consequences for the organization of roles. Departmental specialization is one major outcome. Movement across ministries is likely to be viewed with disfavor by both superiors and subordinates since it introduces a discordant note of career unpredictability. Furthermore, knowledge acquired in one department or ministry is not always easily transferable. Nor is a transfer with promotion easily translated into advancement by its recipient and his or her new colleagues. New superiors must now expand or reorganize their structures of advancement. Equals or subordinates are uneasy about how to integrate the newcomer and uncertain as to how his or her presence affects the patterns of promotion—that is, their expectations.

This stress on hierarchy as predictability is also evident in personal terms. Monopoly or near monopoly of higher offices by those who committed themselves to the bureaucratic role while still pursuing their education produces a distinct segment of the administrative organization and provides predictable boundaries that cannot be crossed. This produces a condition in which the entry level is highly uniform. Individuals here possess pretty much the same skills and experience. Without some highly visible means of predicting early career movement, incentives to give up other alternatives would have to be relatively high. This appears to be resolved by resorting to seniority to sustain the career structure and to predictability as an incentive. Because its variability is based on nonevaluative grounds, seniority provides predictability without negative overtones and consequences for later promotion. Distinctions in rank, authority, and status in the early career are thus seen as the products of impersonal, fortuitous conditions. Early commitment and its associated incentive structure thus produces a homogeneous corps of upper-level administrators whose careers are highly predictable and offer high rewards for early career commitment. The specification of the career role is, or appears to be, very consciously dominated by the organization.

Restricted entry into the highest offices, high organizational boundaries formed by early commitment, departmental specialization, and career structure all contribute to the definition of the rational bureaucratic role as one
in which organizational commitment is crucial and the reward for this commitment is high levels of predictability about status and career. When such restrictions on entry, appointment, and promotion exist, the organization has considerable capability to resist outside intervention. Its lack of permeability renders it difficult to manipulate. The autonomy this condition implies makes the higher civil servant an admired figure. To be called a bureaucrat in these systems is no insult. Major examples of this type are: Japan, France, Germany, Spain, Italy, and the Soviet Union.

Professional Orientation

This mode is characterized by the rule that professional or preprofessional training (not necessarily directly related to assuming bureaucratic roles) is the primary criterion for holding higher administrative office. Rather than orientation toward organizational roles and norms, the assumption of the professional role and its accompanying status is considered sufficient and, indeed, superior in this mode of administrative organization. The professionally oriented bureaucratic role stresses the acquisition of a body of knowledge and techniques by the individual. This expertise is accompanied by a public service orientation with a distinctive ethic that justifies the privilege of self-regulation and a status that underscores autonomy and prestige.


10. By preprofessional training I mean the existence of a formal or informal rule that the individual acquire a specific kind of higher education in order to undertake professional training. Thus, for example, and an education at a leading university in England seemed to be a requirement for passing on to the higher status professions of barrister as opposed to solicitor, physician as opposed to surgeon, and high-level administrator as opposed to lower-level ones.

(Larson 1977:x-xii, 187–207; Freidson 1986:20–38; Millerson 1964:5; Barber 1963; Collins 1979; Greenwood 1957; Roth 1974; Cogan 1953).

Where professional orientation is stressed, the bureaucratic organization, very often private as well as public, takes advantage of the existing high social and economic incentives for individuals to take on professional training and roles. By recruiting professionals or those with preprofessional training, the organization needs to offer high incentives for early commitment to the bureaucratic career. The promised rewards of a professional career already provide such incentives. Instead, incentives are directed toward recognizing the status of the professional role through salary, flexibility of entry (lateral entry and/or promotion through the ranks—the latter indicating that professional status has been achieved), flexibility of assignment, and greater discretion and autonomy (Hammond and Miller 1985:6). In this arrangement, career structures are less systematic and predictable. Seniority plays a lesser role in determining promotion. So-called "fast-tracks" exist; these take advantage of and offer incentives for higher levels of professional capacity. As one might expect, organizational specialization and hierarchy tend to suffer in this context.

In this kind of organizational environment, professional training and some forms of preprofessional training result in the acquisition of a body of knowledge and techniques defined by an association of practitioners. The profession has defined the individual as the means by which information is transmitted and as the source for the decision about the conditions under which it can be used. The internalization of skills and the norms of their use by the individual makes organizational definition of these aspects through career experience and formal rules less necessary. Moreover, the individual’s internalization of the criteria for the appropriate use of his or her’s skills produces high predictability of role behavior. Since predictability of individual behavior is high, organizational definition of hierarchy as a means of delimiting discretion need not be heavily emphasized (Perrin 1986:22–23; Freidson and Rhea 1965). This kind of role structure can produce considerable homogeneity among senior officials, but it is a uniformity of outlook fashioned by the professional rather than the organizational role.

Precisely because the professionally oriented bureaucratic role is governed by norms derived from extra-organizational sources to a greater or lesser degree, the organization is likely to be more permeable than is the case in the organizationally oriented mode. The emphasis on professional training makes public and private bureaucratic roles relatively interchangeable. This capacity for interchangeability has the consequence of encouraging or allowing both vertical and horizontal mobility between organizations. Organizational boundaries are lower, making them more permeable. In this organiza-
tional mode, the term bureaucrat unaccompanied by professional status is often used as a pejorative term. The United States,\textsuperscript{11} Great Britain,\textsuperscript{12} Canada,\textsuperscript{13} and Switzerland\textsuperscript{14} are examples of this mode.

In sum, then, we can distinguish between two general patterns of the institutionalization of the rationalized administrative role. Each has quite different structural characteristics attendant on the definition of the role. In one mode, stress is placed on the role of organizations in determining tasks. Rules, especially those that quantify and qualify bureaucratic office, operate to define tasks and the conditions of whatever skills the individual possesses.

In the absence of internalized norms of discretion and praxis, organizational rules perform these duties. In the other mode, the role is characterized by the individual acquisition and control of a task. In societies where this mode is dominant the task is usually defined as a complex one entrusted by training to the individual who views himself or herself as better suited to determine the conditions of its use than any organizational structure. In a sense, task and skill make up the central notion that defines occupation and, at a longer distance, role as well. The existence of these two patterns suggests two tentative conclusions regarding the structural relationships between professionalization and bureaucratization. First, it is sometimes argued that the mutual incompatibility of professional and bureaucratic roles makes relatively little sense in the case of national state bureaucracies. As a number of studies have shown, the two elements are not incompatible in a wide range of organizational settings (Blau 1968 and 1970; Blau, Heydebrand, and Stauffer 1973; Meyer 1968; Katz and Kahn 1966; Montagna 1973; Hall 1968). The second possibility is that Stinchcombe is correct in suggesting bureaucratization and professionalism as two types of rational administration (Stinchcombe 1959:183–86; also, Litwak 1959–60). To explain, then, the course of the institutionalization of rational state bureaucracy, the operational problem is to explain why rational bureaucratic organization developed in these two


\textsuperscript{14} See: Chapman 1959; Friedrich and Cole 1932; Ruffieux 1975; Montotheo Marx 1957; Décosterd 1959.

... modes across quite different polities at different stages in their social and economic development. This work describes how two types of strategies evolved—in France and Japan on the one hand, and in the United States and Great Britain on the other—and led to the institutionalization of these two modes of legal-rational state bureaucratization.