It seems to me that the reason for lack of interesting and non-obvious generalization from cases and other specific empirical studies is clearly that the broad-gauged theories of politics are not related, perhaps are not relatable, to observable cases. In general, American political science seems to be subject to a continuing fission of theory and research, in which the empiricist is not sufficiently mindful of his role as system-builder and the system-builder is not sufficiently mindful (if at all) of the role that theory is supposed to play. What is needed is a basis for cumulating, comparing, and contrasting diverse findings. Such a framework or interpretative scheme would bring the diverse cases and findings into a more consistent relation to each other and would begin to suggest generalizations sufficiently close to the data to be relevant and sufficiently abstract to be subject to more broadly theoretical treatment.

An attempt at such a framework follows.

The scheme is based upon the following argument: (1) The types of relationships to be found among people are determined by their expectations—by what they hope to achieve or get from relating to others. (2) In politics, expectations are determined by governmental outputs or policies. (3) Therefore, a political relationship is determined by the type of policy at stake, so that for every type of policy there is likely to be a distinctive type of political relationship. If power is defined as a share in the making of policy, or authoritative allocations, then the political relationship in question is a power relationship or, over time, a power structure. As Dahl would say, one must ask, “Power for what?” One must control for the scope of power and look for elites, power structures, and the like within each of the predefined scopes or “issue areas.”


ther. Issues as such are too ephemeral: it is on the basis of established expectations and a history of earlier government decisions of the same type that single issues are fought out. The study of single issues provides a good test of hypotheses about structure, but the hypotheses must be arrived at in some other, independent way.

Obviously, the major analytic problem is that of identifying types of outputs or policies. The approach I have taken is to define policies in terms of their impact or expected impact on the society. When policies are defined this way, there are only a limited number of types; when all is said and done, there are only a limited number of functions that governments can perform. This approach cashiers the "politics of agriculture" and the "politics of education" or, even more narrowly but typically, "the politics of the ARA bill" or "the politics of the 1956 Aid to Education bill," in which the composition and strategy of the participants are fairly well-known before the study is begun. But it maintains the pluralist's resistance to the assumption that there is only one power structure for every political system. My approach replaces the descriptive, subject-matter categories of the pluralists with functional categories. There is no need to argue that the classification scheme exhausts all the possibilities even among domestic policies; it is sufficient if most policies and the agencies that implement them can be categorized with little, if any, damage to the nuances.

There are three major categories of public policies in the scheme: distribution, regulation, and redistribution. These types are historically as well as functionally distinct, distribution being almost the exclusive type of national domestic policy from 1789 until virtually 1890. Agitation for regulatory and redistributive policies began at about the same time, but regulation had become an established fact before any headway at all was made in redistribution.2

These categories are not mere contrivances for purposes of simplification. They are meant to correspond to real phenomena—so much so that the major hypotheses of the scheme follow directly from the categories and their definitions. Thus, these areas of policy or government activity constitute real arenas of power. Each arena tends to develop its own characteristic political structure, political process, elites, and group relations. What remains is to identify these arenas, to formulate hypotheses about the attributes of each, and to test the scheme by how many empirical relationships it can anticipate and explain.

2Foreign policy, for which no appropriate "-tion" word has been found, is obviously a fourth category. It is not dealt with here for two reasons. First, it overly extends the analysis. Second, and of greater importance, it is in many ways not part of the same universe, because its foreign policy-making America is only a subsystem. Winston Churchill, among other foreigners, has consistently participated in our foreign policy decisions. Of course, those aspects of foreign and military policy that have direct domestic implications are included in my scheme.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arena</th>
<th>Primary Political Unit</th>
<th>Relation Among Units</th>
<th>Power Structure</th>
<th>Stability of Structure</th>
<th>Primary Decisional Locus</th>
<th>Implementation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distribution</td>
<td>Individual, firm corporation</td>
<td>Log-rolling, mutual noninterference, uncommon interests</td>
<td>Non-conflictual elite with support groups</td>
<td>Stable</td>
<td>Congressional committee and/or agency**</td>
<td>Agency centralized to primary functional unit (&quot;bureau&quot;)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulation*</td>
<td>Group</td>
<td>&quot;The coalition,&quot; shared subject-matter interest, bargaining</td>
<td>Pluralistic, multi-centered, &quot;theory of balance&quot;</td>
<td>Unstable</td>
<td>Congress, in classic role</td>
<td>Agency decentralized from center by &quot;delegation,&quot; mixed control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redistribution</td>
<td>Association</td>
<td>The &quot;peak association,&quot; class, ideology</td>
<td>Confictual elite, i.e., elite and counterelite</td>
<td>Stable</td>
<td>Executive and peak associations</td>
<td>Agency centralized toward top (above &quot;bureau&quot;), elaborate standards</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Given the multiplicity of organized interests in the regulatory arena, there are obviously many cases of successful log-rolling coalitions that resemble the coalitions prevailing in distributive politics. In this respect, the difference between the regulatory and the distributive arenas is thus one of degree. The predominant form of coalition in regulatory politics is deemed to be that of common or tangential interest. Although the difference is only one of degree, it is significant because this prevailing type of coalition makes the regulatory arena so much more unstable, unpredictable, and non-elite ("Balance of power"). When we turn to the redistributive arena, however, we find differences of principle in every sense of the word.

**Distributive politics tends to stabilize around an institutional unit. In most cases, it is the Congressional committee (or subcommittee). But in others, particularly in the Department of Agriculture, the focus is the agency or the agency and the committee. In the cities, this is the arena where machine domination continues, if machines were in control in the first place.